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This paper aims to discuss two realist conceptions about causation in the light 
of the general theory of relativity (GTR). I first consider the conserved quantity 
of causation, which explicitly relies on the energy conservation principle. Such 
principle is however problematic within GTR, mainly because of the dynamical 
nature of the spacetime structure itself. I then turn to the causal theory of 
properties, according to which (fundamental physical) properties are such that 
insofar as they are certain qualities, they are powers to produce certain effects. 
In order to be compatible with GTR, such theory has to assume non-trivial 
global conditions on the spacetime structure; such assumptions seem to 
deprive the „singularist‟ non-Humean feature of this theory of causation. The 
question of the possible causal nature of spacetime (metrical) properties is 




The question about the nature of causation is one of the most fundamental 
questions in philosophy of nature. In an analytical approach, this paper aims to 
discuss some aspects of this question in the light of one of our best 
fundamental physical theories, the general theory of relativity (GTR). If the 
possible link between causation, space and time is clearly not new (think about 
the standard Humean conception for instance), GTR might put some novel 
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constraints on it (to the extent that it is relevant for such question). More 
specifically, I will discuss the constraints exerted by GTR on two realist 
conceptions of causation which have been widely discussed in the literature 
recently. 
I will first consider the conception of causation in terms of conserved 
quantities, such as recently developed and discussed by Wesley Salmon (1998, 
2002) and Phil Dowe (2000a) (section 2). This conception of causation 
considers the fundamental causal relations as physical relations whose nature 
relies on the physical principle of conservation of (mass-)energy. It seems clear 
that such physicalist and mechanistic conception of causation must come to 
terms with what our fundamental physical theories, such as GTR, say about our 
actual world. So the fact that within GTR there is in the general case no 
meaningful energy conservation (in a precise sense which is discussed below) 
might have important consequences for the conserved quantity theory of 
causation (section 3). 
This conception of causation is a realist and non-Humean one in the sense 
that it considers fundamental causal relations as objective (mind-independent) 
and singularist (regularities-independent) relations in the physical world. 
However, such empirical conception does not say anything about necessity or 
about the irreducible causal feature of the relation between cause and effect – 
feature which is often hold as essential for any realist conception of causation.1 
Such aspect is taken into account within the causal conception of properties, or 
conception in terms of dispositions or powers, according to which fundamental 
physical properties are such that insofar as they are certain qualities, they are 
powers to produce certain effects: these effects can so be understood as the 
necessary consequence of the very nature of the considered properties (section 
4). Within such realist conception of causation, developed and defended by 
Rom Harré and Edward Madden (1975), Sydney Shoemaker (1980), Stephen 
Mumford (1998) and Alexander Bird (2007) among others, the fundamental 
physical properties then have an irreducible causal nature; causation is then 
bound to the very nature of properties, reflecting its objective and fundamental 
nature. It seems clear that the existence of such irreducible causal nature of 
properties is not an empirical question that science and fundamental physics in 
particular could settle: indeed, a world where the fundamental physical 
 
1 See for instance Chakravartty 2005. 
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properties are categorical (non-causal) is not qualitatively distinct from a world 
where the fundamental physical properties are irreducibly dispositional 
(causal). This is a metaphysical distinction. However, insofar as we require that 
a conception about causation has to be compatible with what fundamental 
physics tells us, fundamental physics might provide relevant arguments in the 
debate. In particular, I will discuss some arguments from GTR (section 5). It 
should be made clear that this paper aims less to argue in favor or against these 
two conceptions of causation than to provide an interesting case of fruitful 
interaction between physics and metaphysics.  
 
 
2. CONSERVED QUANTITY THEORY 
In this section, I will briefly present the main elements of the theory of 
conserved quantity, as presented by Dowe (the differences with Salmon‟s 
version are not relevant here). Within this theory, causation is understood in 
terms of causal interactions and causal processes, which are themselves defined 
in physical terms.2 A causal interaction is an intersection of worldlines that 
involves an exchange of a conserved quantity. A worldline is a (timelike or 
null3) curve in spacetime that represents the history of an object. The notion of 
exchange is understood here in a minimal way and only requires a change in the 
value of the conserved quantity for at least one incoming and one outgoing 
worldline involved in the interaction4 and such that the corresponding 
conservation law holds. A conserved quantity is any physical quantity that 
satisfies a conservation law in any given spacetime region.5 Our current best 
physical theories give us indications of what these conserved quantities might 
be; such conception of causation depends therefore strongly on what these 
fundamental physical theories have to say. One generally considers (mass-) 
 
2 I follow Dowe 2000a for most of the definitions of the conserved quantity theory. 
3 A curve in spacetime (M, gab) is said to be timelike or null if for all points p of the curve the 
tangent vector ta(p) to the curve is timelike, that is, such that gab(ta(p)tb(p))<0, or null, that is, such that 
gab(ta(p)tb(p))= 0, with (-, +, +, +) as the signature of gab.  
4 „Incoming‟ and „outgoing‟ are labels defined by the local light cone structure and are 
interchangeable, see Dowe 2000a, p. 92. 
5 As such, it does not need to be a law: what is required is only that the relevant conservation 
statements hold in the actual physical world, independently of the question about their possible lawlike 
nature (Dowe 2000a, p. 96; Salmon 1998, p. 259; Psillos 2002, p. 121). I will discuss below a 
mathematical representation of such conservation statement. 
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energy as the relevant conserved quantity within the analysis of causation. 
There are two main reasons for that. First, conservation of (mass-)energy is of 
fundamental importance for contemporary physics and seems to be an 
experimentally successful principle in our world. Second, there seems to be a 
close connection between (mass-)energy and causation, which has already been 
exploited by some philosophers in the past, such as Bertrand Russell and Hans 
Reichenbach for instance, and which is at the basis of the conserved quantity 
approach of causation6: the idea is roughly that two events are causally related 
if and only if they are in a certain relation with respect to their (mass-)energy. 
The second fundamental element of the conserved quantity theory is the 
causal process, which is a worldline of an object that possesses a conserved 
quantity. The possession of a conserved quantity by an object is to be 
understood as the instantiation of this conserved quantity conceived as a 
property. The notion of object is conceived here in a very broad sense. To the 
extent that we are considering causation at the fundamental level, objects are 
the fundamental elements that constitute the ontology, like particles or fields 
for instance. The conserved quantity theory does not take position in the 
traditional debates in the metaphysics of objects and properties.7 The main 
claim of the CQ theory is that there is a causal relation between two events if 
and only if they are linked by a set of causal processes and causal interactions 
such that any change of an object or any change of a conserved quantity occurs 
at a causal interaction and the changes in the conserved quantities are governed 
by the physical conservation laws.8  
 
 
3. CONSERVED QUANTITY THEORY AND PHYSICS OF GENERAL RELATIVITY 
The notions of (total) energy of a physical system and of conservation of this 
energy constitute a difficult and tricky topic in GTR. The difficulties come 
 
6 See for instance Fair 1979 and Curiel 2000, §.2. 
7 However, this definition of a causal process requires that the object, whose world line is a causal 
process, has identity through time, sometimes called genidentity, in particular in order to distinguish a 
causal process from so-called pseudo-processes, such as a moving spot of light along a wall (Salmon 
2002, p. 113-116). 
8 An event is understood here as the instantiation of properties in a given space-time region 
(ultimately a space-time point), the „content‟ of a space-time region (without any commitment to a 
specific space-time ontology); in particular, a causal interaction is an event. 
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from the fundamental GTR property according to which the gravitational field 
and the spacetime structure are described as one and the same physical 
structure within GTR.9 The spacetime structure is then fundamentally 
dynamical and there is (in the general case) no non-dynamical background with 
respect to which physical systems can be considered.10 This property, often 
called „background independence‟, is taken by many physicists and 
philosophers of physics to be the distinctive feature of GTR and one of the 
main difficulties towards a coherent view between GTR and quantum field 
theory (QFT), which relies on a non-dynamical spacetime background. As a 
consequence of this dynamical nature, there is in general no natural family of 
timelike curves representing observers all at rest with respect to each other; 
therefore, within GTR, a given observer cannot in general define the energy of 
a distant particle.11 From a technical point of view, this comes in the general 
case from the lack of the symmetries that are required for such family of curves 
to exist (a general solution of the Einstein field equations does not possess 
timelike Killing fields). Without such symmetries it is not possible to express 
an energy conservation law in a given spacetime region: there is in general no 
integral (mass-)energy conservation law within GTR.12 It should be clear that 
 
9 Spacetime is represented by an equivalence class of pairs (M, gab), where the Lorentz metric 
tensor field gab encodes the inertio-gravitational effects as well as the fundamental spacetime relations. 
Within GTR, spacetime and the gravitational field can be understood as a physical structure in the 
precise sense of a network of physical relations (spacetime and gravitational relations) among relata 
that do not possess any intrinsic identity (as made explicite by the invariance under active 
diffeomorphisms); see Esfeld and Lam 2008, and Lam 2010a. 
10 More precisely, the metric-gravitational field cannot be decomposed uniquely into an inertial 
(non-dynamical) part plus a gravitational (dynamical) part. 
11 See Wald 1984, p. 69. 
12 Within GR, we have the „differential energy conservation‟ aTab = 0, where Tab is the stress-
energy-momentum tensor representing the energy-momentum distribution and   s the covariant 
derivative associated with the metric. But such differential expression does not represent a meaningful 
conservation statement valid on any (finite) spacetime region. Indeed, there is in general no unit 
timelike vector field va such that avb = 0 or merely such that avb + bva = 0 (Killing‟s equation): this 
means that there is in general no family of observers all at rest with each other (with parallel 4-
velocities). Therefore, there is no meaningful (integral) energy-momentum conservation law in the 
(integral) form of S  Ja na dS = 0 where Ja = - Tabvb is the (mass-)energy current density 4-vector 
measured by the observers represented by va, S is a 3-dimensional boundary of any 4-dimensional 
space-time region and na is the unit normal (like in the flat Minkowski space-time of special relativity: 
see Wald 1984, pp. 69-70). 
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this fact is not an epistemological question but is a consequence of the very 
nature of spacetime and of the gravitational field. 
From the point of view of the universally interacting gravitational field, the 
failure of integral (non-gravitational) energy conservation is an obvious 
consequence of not taking into account gravitational energy: strictly speaking, 
there cannot be non-gravitational energy-momentum conservation since any 
physical system interacts with the gravitational field and its energy can 
transform into gravitational energy and vice versa. So, it seems natural to think 
that one would just need to take into account the energy of the gravitational 
field in order to obtain an energy conservation law. Things are however a bit 
more complicated. Indeed, gravitational energy cannot be represented by a 
(unique) coordinate-free geometric object (that is, for instance, by a tensor 
field). It is always possible at any spacetime point to find a coordinate system in 
which (infinitesimally) there is no gravitational energy.13 As a consequence, 
gravitational energy can be understood as non-local in the precise sense that 
the amount of gravitational energy in any given spacetime region cannot be 
defined in a unambiguous way.14 In the general case, there cannot be energy 
conservation insofar as gravitational energy cannot be taken into account; 
gravitational energy can be transformed into non-gravitational energy and can 
therefore increase or decrease the amount of energy that is present in a given 
spacetime region. 
Although not much debated in philosophy of physics yet, this conclusion 
and its consequences for the conserved quantity theory have been discussed by 
Alexander Rueger (1998) and Erik Curiel (2000). Due to the lack of a 
meaningful energy conservation law, the notions of exchange and of possession 
of energy as well as the notion itself of energy as a conserved quantity become 
problematic, so that the fundamental notions of causal interactions and of 
causal processes are undermined. GR tells us that, in general, there can be no 
genuine (mass-)energy conservation law and so no such conservation law can 
 
13 This is often understood as a consequence of Einstein‟s equivalence principle, see for instance 
Misner et al. 1973, p. 386; however, the meaning of the equivalence principle(s) is trickier, see 
Norton 1993, §.4.1.  
14 Hoefer (2000) argues that this non-local feature of gravitational energy precisely shows that it 
does not constitute a meaningful form of energy. Actually, there seems to be difficulties with the very 
notions of energy and mass (gravitational or not) within GTR, see for instance Jaramillo and 
Gourgoulhon 2010 as well as the discussion in Lam 2010b. These questions do not alter the point 
that in general there is no meaningful energy conservation law.   
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rule the exchange of (mass-)energy as a conserved quantity in a causal 
interaction. The characterization of „causal‟ for an interaction then loses its 
fundamental meaning and one cannot say unambiguously whether two events 
are causally related or not. 
Insofar as the energy conservation constitutes a fundamental principle 
within contemporary physics, it might still seem that the conserved quantity 
theory, in grounding causation on this principle, does well capture a 
fundamental aspect of the world. However, it seems that such a position would 
amount to dismiss the moral of one of our two most fundamental physical 
theories: the spacetime structure and the gravitational field are one and the 
same physical entity, which possesses energy and momentum and which is 
dynamically (and universally) related to the whole non-gravitational (mass-) 
energy. From the GTR point of view, the relevance of the energy conservation 
principle in most physical theories and in particular in quantum theory comes 
from the fact that these theories require a non-dynamical spacetime structure 
that possesses the high degree of symmetry needed to define an energy 
conservation law. Indeed, within GTR, there exists a well-defined notion of 
total energy for an isolated physical system, that is, a physical system in an 
asymptotically flat spacetime (without entering into the details, spacetime 
becomes Minkowskian „very far‟ from the considered system). Although very 
useful and justified in many concrete cases, such idealizations cannot 
constitute the empirical basis for any account of causation that pretends to be 
fundamental. 
Another possible position of the friend of the conserved quantity theory is 
first to explicitly consider this conception of causation as contingent, for 
instance on the existence of conservation laws in our actual world, and then to 
maintain that our actual world does possess the required properties, namely 
the high degree of spacetime symmetry necessary for conservation laws (in the 
case of energy conservation, the spacetime structure has to be invariant under 
temporal translations (such spacetime is called stationary). Such position is 
endorsed by Dowe (2000a, 2000b), who considers the conserved quantity 
theory as an empirical analysis of causation in our actual world in contrast to a 
metaphysics of causation valid in all possible worlds; according to him, such 
empirical analysis has to rely on the results of science – this is precisely the 
methodology here. The results from GTR applied to our actual world tend to 
show that, contrary to what Dowe (2000a, p. 97; 2000b, p. 24) says, our 
universe does not possess strictly speaking the required high degree of 
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symmetry (Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker solutions, which 
constitute the standard model of contemporary cosmology, are highly 
symmetric, in particular homogenous and isotropic, but it is clear that these 
physically relevant solutions only constitute approximations of our actual 
universe).15 
That the conserved quantity theory requires such specific conditions (from 
a GTR point of view) seems to reflect the fact that this theory considers 
causation among material objects against a fixed, non-dynamical 
background.16 But, as we have discussed above, GTR describes spacetime as a 
fundamentally dynamical physical entity that possesses energy and momentum 
and such that strictly speaking it is not possible to isolate a „causal‟ process 
from „causal‟ interactions with the spacetime structure or gravitational field. 
The conserved quantity theory provides a good example of the fruitful 
relations between metaphysics of nature and physics: motivated by physical 
considerations, this realist conception of causation is put into question by even 
more fundamental physical considerations. In a similar way, any metaphysical 
position about nature should be discussed in the light of what fundamental 
physics tells us. It is clear that there is no direct implication between physics 
and metaphysics of nature; however, physics can bring some relevant light on 
certain metaphysical conceptions, such as in the case of the realist conceptions 
of causation. In the same move, I now discuss the realist conception of 
causation in terms of dispositions or powers. 
 
   
4. CAUSAL THEORY OF PROPERTIES 
Within the conserved quantity theory, causation is considered as an objective 
feature of the world, but the more metaphysical question about the necessary 
(or irreducibly causal) nature of the causal relation is not addressed. On the 
one hand, despite their objective and singularist character, the causal 
processes and interactions of Salmon‟s and Dowe‟s theory can be understood 
 
15 Curiel (2000, pp. 47-48) underlines the fact that the slightest inhomogeneity breaks the 
required symmetry and that nothing so particular would correspond to our actual world. 
16 For instance, Curiel (2000, p. 47) underlines the fact that a timelike Killing field can be 
understood as a kind of privileged fixed temporal background against which conserved quantities can 
be considered. 
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as supervenient on a non-causal, Humean basis.17 On the other hand, it seems 
possible to consider properties within the conserved quantity theory as 
irreducibly causal in the sense that their very nature is to produce certain 
effects.18 From an empiricist point of view, one may wonder what would be the 
benefits of considering fundamental physical properties in terms of causal 
powers whose irreducible causal nature seems out of reach of empirical 
sciences (such consideration constitutes the crux of the Humean criticism). 
Within the contemporary debate, a more or less explicit motivation among the 
proponents of such conception comes from the way fundamental physics seems 
to work: indeed, it seems that we only gain knowledge about a fundamental 
physical property through the way it interacts, that is, through the causal 
relations in which it stands. If this epistemic specificity suggests that 
fundamental physical properties possess some dispositional nature, it does not 
constitutes a powerful enough argument against some underlying categorical 
basis for these properties. However, this epistemic specificity fits well with one 
of the main (purely metaphysical) arguments in favor of the causal theory of 
properties: insofar as we have access to the fundamental physical properties 
only through the causal relations in which they stand, their possible categorical 
nature is independent of their nomological and causal role. Such possible 
categorical nature is therefore a primitive and inaccessible qualitative feature (a 
„quiddity‟) of the properties and forces us to some „humility‟ in the sense that 
we cannot know what the properties are. From an empiricist point of view, it is 
not very satisfying to accept such inaccessible qualitative nature of properties. 
Two fundamental physical properties that are qualitatively distinct in virtue of 
their distinct categorical nature can therefore stand in exactly the same causal 
and nomological relations (corresponding to what we would consider to be the 
charge for instance). Such metaphysical underdetermination vanishes if one 
accepts a causal theory of properties according to which their nature is (the 
power, the disposition) to produce certain effects. So, two distinct properties 
in virtue of their very nature cannot produce exactly the same effects and 
cannot stand in exactly the same causal relations. These latter are then a 
consequence of the very nature of the relevant properties and have therefore an 
objective and necessary character: insofar as the nature of a fundamental 
physical property is to produce certain effects, these latter constitute the 
 
17 See for instance Psillos 2002, §.4.5.4. 
18 Chakravartty (2005, §.5) briefly discusses this possibility. 
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necessary consequence of the nature of the considered property. The 
fundamental physical properties are then conceived as possessing some 
irreducible dispositional essence or as irreducible causal powers, which do not 
require any external triggering condition (it is the very nature of properties to 
produce certain effects). The details and subtleties of the different versions of 
the causal theory of properties in terms of causal powers or irreducible 
dispositions are not relevant for the discussion here.19 The main point is that 
there is an important purely metaphysical argument in favor of the causal 
theory of properties (although motivated by an empiricist stance, this 
metaphysical argument is independent from the above mentioned epistemic 
considerations), that is in favor of a strong causal realism, binding causation to 
the very nature of fundamental physical properties.20 
As already mentioned, the main aim here is not to discuss this conception 
as such. Rather, the idea is to consider the interactions between this 
metaphysical conception about causation and the physics of GTR. More 
specifically, I consider the consequences of the fundamental dynamical nature 
of spacetime for the causal theory of properties. Some (non-trivial) global 
constraints have to be imposed on the spacetime structure in order to secure 
the coherence of the causal conception of properties. It then seems that an 
important aspect of this conception is affected by these constraints: the 
singularist character of the causal relation. If one considers two events A and B 
(instantiations of fundamental physical properties for instance) as related by a 
causal relation in the sense that the very nature of A is to produce the effect B, 
then the causal nature of the relation as well as the very existence of the event B 
rely entirely (in a local, singularist way) on the event A. On the contrary, 
according to the non-singularist, Humean conception of causation, the causal 
link between A and B depends on the regularities in the world between all 
events of type A and all events of type B; actually, it may supervene on the 
entire distribution of fundamental physical properties (as within David Lewis‟ 
thesis of Humean supervenience21).22 Among the proponents of the causal 
 
19 See for instance Shoemaker 1980, Mumford 1998, Bird 2007, Chakravartty 2007. 
20 According to the proponents of the causal theory of properties, the main metaphysical 
argument about „quiddity‟ is not the only one in favor of this conception; they also offer arguments 
from quantum physics (entangled quantum systems possessing irreducible dispositions to dissolve the 
entanglement for instance) and from GTR as well (spacetime properties as causal – see section 6); see 
recently Esfeld 2009 as well as references therein.  
21 See for instance Lewis 1986, pp. ix-x. 
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theory of properties, this singularist aspect of causation is not controversial 
and is considered as an advantage since only the nature of the relevant 
properties have to be considered in order to account for a causal relation. But 
the this singular character of the causal relation seems to be affected by the 
global constraints on the spacetime structure that have to be assumed: it seems 
that the causal nature of the relation does not only depend on the nature of the 
property that is considered as the cause any more, but also on global properties 
of the spacetime structure. Before discussing further this point, it is useful to 
consider in some more details the constraints that the proponents of the causal 
theory of properties have to assume.  
 
 
5. CAUSAL THEORY OF PROPERTIES AND PHYSICS OF GENERAL RELATIVITY 
One of the central points of GTR is that spacetime and the gravitational field 
constitute one and the same dynamical physical structure, which possesses 
(gravitational) energy and which universally interacts with gravitational and 
non-gravitational (mass-)energy – interaction that is encoded in the Einstein 
field equations. As a consequence of the dynamical nature of the spacetime 
structure, the spacetime topology can be non-trivial. Within special relativity, 
the inert Minkowski metric defines for all spacetime points a future and past 
light cone („future‟ and „past‟ are here interchangeable labels, modulo a certain 
consistency constraint called „time orientability‟). The future light cone of any 
spacetime point p determines the set of events that can be causally influenced 
by an event at p, that is for instance the set of spacetime points that can be 
reached by physical particle starting at p and travelling at a speed less or equal 
the speed of light (and similarly for the past light cone). This light cone 
structure exists only locally within GTR, that is, it is only valid for some 
 
22 It is possible that the relata of the causal relations may not be local and pointlike entities; for 
instance, within the framework of ontic structural realism, it has recently been suggested that the 
physical structures (defined in the precise sense of a network of concrete physical relations among 
concrete physical relata) are themselves causal (French 2006, Esfeld 2009); however, how structures 
and relations can possess causal powers remains obscure (French 2006, §.VI). In any case, the central 
feature of the singularist aspect of this conception of causation is that the cause (for instance the state 
of the world at a certain time) necessarily produces the effect (for instance the state of the world at a 
certain later time – this example is discussed in section 5) in virtue of its very nature and 
independently of the rest of the fundamental physical properties.   
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neighborhood (called „normal‟) of any spacetime point p; things can be 
radically different at the global level. Indeed, in a dynamical (non-flat) 
spacetime, the set I+(p) of events that can be reached by a physical particle 
starting at p and following a (future oriented) timelike curve does not coincide 
with the interior of the future light cone at p (which is actually only defined 
locally for some neighborhood of p – strictly speaking, the light cone is on the 
tangent space at p). In particular, it is perfectly possible that pI+(p), which 
means that there exists a future oriented closed timelike curve through p. In 
such spacetime and within the framework of a realist conception of causation, 
an event can therefore causally influence events in its past and can causally 
interacts with itself; this latter aspect might be the most problematic one, in 
particular within the framework of the causal theory of properties. It seems 
indeed difficult to maintain that the nature of an instantiation of a property is to 
produce itself. Two attitudes are now possible. First, to accept the causally 
pathological behaviors as physically possible (in our actual world). Such 
attitude is motivated by the fact that many solutions to the Einstein field 
equations (among which some can apply to our actual world) possess closed 
timelike curves (for instance, the Kerr-Newman solution, which describes 
spacetime around a rotating charged mass, can contain such curves). In such 
cases, it seems that the causal theory of properties as presented in the last 
section is not compatible with GTR. Insofar as GTR provides an experimentally 
successful description of the world, this consequence constitutes an important 
drawback for the causal theory of properties. A second attitude is to dismiss 
solutions containing closed timelike curves as physically non relevant. Such 
attitude can be justified by the fact that many solutions of the Einstein field 
equations that contain closed timelike curves are artificial and do not 
correspond to physical situations in our actual world (for instance it is in 
general considered that the famous Gödel solution does not correspond to any 
region of our universe; in the above given example, the Kerr-Newman metric 
more specifically describing spacetime outside a charged rotating black hole 
does not contain closed timelike curves; moreover, global considerations on 
certain physical laws, such as Maxwell equations, can be invoked to exclude the 
existence of closed timelike curves). Such attitude is however controversial 
among philosophers of science as well as among physicists.23 I will however 
 
23 See for example the discussion in Earman 1995, §.6.4 – for instance, the Kerr-Newman 
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adopt this attitude here in order to provide a physical framework in which the 
causal theory of properties can be discussed. It is therefore possible to impose 
a global constraint that excludes the solutions containing closed timelike 
curves („chronology condition‟). It is straightforward that such condition is not 
sufficient and that it is also necessary for our purpose here to exclude closed 
null curves as well („simple causality condition‟). It seems that this latter global 
condition provides the causal theory of properties with a safe (causally well-
behaved) environment. But this is far from certain. Indeed, the „simple 
causality condition‟ does not exclude timelike curves that are „almost closed‟ in 
the sense that for some (possibly infinitesimal) neighborhood U of a spacetime 
point p, a timelke curve starting at p can cross U more than once. Such „almost 
closed‟ curves can be excluded by the „strong causality condition‟. Moreover, it 
is likely (but not necessary) that the proponent of some strong causal realism 
may want to derive some temporal order out of the more fundamental causal 
order (this move allows her to ground the notion of change in the notion of 
causal production). The existence of a global time function24 seems mandatory 
for such derivation to be possible (and maybe for the very notions of change 
and temporal evolution too).25 The existence of such function is guaranteed by 
a stronger condition, called the „stable causality condition‟. Indeed, there 
exists a whole hierarchy of stronger and stronger causality conditions (a given 
condition implying the weaker ones) that one can impose on the Einstein field 
equations solutions. The strongest is the „global hyperbolicity condition‟, 
according to which spacetime has the topology of a product R x , where R 
 
solution that contains closed timelike curves can be understood as representing the spacetime 
generated by the gravitational collapse of a rotating star that does not lead to a black hole – physical 
possibility which cannot a priori be excluded) 
24 A global time function is a function t from the manifold M to the reals such that t(p)<t(q) for all 
p, qM that are linked by (future oriented) timelike curve from p to q. In general such function is not 
unique. It should be clear that the existence of such functions does not imply any notion of objective 
temporal distance between two events. 
25 The notions of temporal evolution and change are notoriously problematic within GTR 
(„problem of time‟), in particular because of the (gauge-theoretic) diffeomorphism invariance of the 
theory; accordingly, the definition of meaningful observables (in the sense of Dirac or Bergmann) and 
the characterization of their „evolution‟ are very difficult tasks within GTR. It is however possible to 
define gauge-invariant „correlational‟ observables (or „coincidence‟ observables as Earman 2002 dubs 
them with respect to Einstein‟s intuitions), such as Komar events, together with a meaningful notion 
of (not necessarily temporal) „evolution‟; the Global Positioning System (GPS) can be considered as a 
technological implementation of such „correlational‟ observables (see Rovelli 2004, ch.2; about the 
problem of time, see Rickles 2006 and references therein).  
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represents the real line and  a 3-dimensional hypersurface, called Cauchy 
surface, such that no (inextendible) timelike or null curve crosses  more than 
once (in some sense,  represents the universe „at a certain time‟).26 Such 
condition provides the possibility – very attractive for the proponent of the 
causal theory of properties – of an initial value formulation of the theory: 
without entering into the details, the set of initial data on a Cauchy surface 
completely determines (in a precise sense) the spatio-temporal (gravitational) 
and material structures on the rest of the spacetime. The causal realist can then 
be tempted to consider the relevant properties on the initial Cauchy surface as 
causally generating (producing) the entire (physical state of the) universe.27 
The aim here is not to discuss to what extent the causal theory of properties 
requires this whole hierarchy of global conditions imposed on the spacetime 
structure. It is sufficient here to highlight the fact that such metaphysical 
conception about causation requires to impose (at least) some of these 
conditions; the „simple causality condition‟ has to be at least required for the 
conception of causation as production to be make sense.28 As already 
discussed, it might be the case that further conditions from the hierarchy might 
be needed for such conception about causation to be plausible. The important 
point is that these conditions are global constraints on the spacetime structure. 
Without entering into the technical details, it seems easy to see for instance 
that the „global hyperbolicity condition‟ is a global condition in the sense that it 
constraints the global topology of the (whole) spacetime structure to be 
equivalent to R x .  
As a consequence, it seems that within this framework the causal relations 
depend on global spacetime properties (such as the global topology). As 
mentioned at the end of the last section, this fact seems to affect the singularist 
aspect of causation within the causal theory of properties. Considering again 
the example of the last section, it seems that the causal relation between the 
event A and the event B does not only depend on the nature of the cause A 
 
26 The spacetime foliation into Cauchy surfaces is not unique and no foliation is privileged. This 
fact constitutes one of the simplest formulations of the famous „problem of time‟ within GTR as well as 
within the various attempts to quantize the theory.   
27 For instance, Maudlin (2007, ch. 6) defends such position, where the laws of nature, 
considered as primitive, rather than causation, underlie the notion of production. 
28 Maudlin (2007, ch. 6) underlines very clearly the fact that according to him the existence of 
closed timelike curves is incompatible with the notion of ontological production at the fundamental 
level. 
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(which is to produce B within the causal, dispositionalist conception of 
properties), but also on global properties of the whole spacetime (gravitational) 
structure. The nature of the causal relation between A and B, as well as the 
existence of B itself, cannot be ontologically grounded uniquely in the nature 
of A. Strictly speaking, the fact that A causes B cannot be uniquely in virtue of 
the nature of A, but also in virtue of the global spacetime (gravitational) 
structure. For instance, let us assume that A and B are located within a region 
U of the spacetime (M, gab), which satisfies the necessary global conditions 
such that it is meaningful to say that A causes B according to the causal theory 
of properties. Let us further consider a distinct spacetime (M', g'ab), which 
does not satisfy these necessary global conditions but which possesses a region 
U' that is exactly similar (in a precise sense) to U (with the events A', B' 
located in U' exactly similar to A, B in U). Now it seems that if A causes B in 
(M, gab) (by hypothesis), A' does not cause B' in (M', g'ab) because for instance 
they might be related by closed timelike curve outside the region U'. So it 
seems that the nature of the causal relation between A and B depends not only 
on the nature of A, but also on the global properties of the spacetime structure 
in which they are.29 
The reply from the proponent of the causal theory of properties is clear: she 
cannot consider (M', g'ab) as metaphysically possible. It is the nature of 
properties to produce effects that globally satisfy the above discussed 
conditions; the global constraints are in some sense encoded in the very nature 
of properties and the singularist aspect of the causal relation remains 
unthreatened. If this reply may seem unsatisfying, there does not seem to be 
any definitive objection against such attitude. Besides the question of the 
relevance of this reply to the challenge of non-trivial topologies, the important 
point here is that this metaphysical conception about causation strongly 
constraints the solutions of the Einstein field equations. Indeed, it should be 
clear that the above discussed hierarchy of causality conditions is not a 
consequence of the theory; it is in general justified by some particular 
conception about causation. As already mentioned, the lack of certain global 
properties of the spacetime structure – a purely empirical question – would put 
the causal theory of properties into a difficult situation.  
 
 
29 A and B need not be local and pointlike for the argument; for instance, they can also represent 
states of the universe „at some given time‟. 
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6. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
The main aim of this paper is not to provide a definitive argument against any 
specific metaphysical conception about causation. However, within the here 
adopted analytical approach, any metaphysical conception about nature can be 
strengthened or weakened by arguments from contemporary physics. So we 
have first considered the conserved quantity theory of causation; through its 
use of the (energy) conservation principle, such conception clearly relies on 
physics. However, we have seen that this it has to face certain difficulties from 
fundamental features of the spacetime (and gravitational) structure as 
described by GTR: the dynamical nature of the gravitational-spacetime 
structure, the lack of non-dynamical, background physical structure with 
respect to which physical entities as well as their (possibly causal) interactions 
can be considered („background independence‟). Indeed, the symmetries that 
are required by the conserved quantity theory constitute some fixed and 
privileged temporal structure with respect to which the conserved quantities 
can be considered. Strictly speaking, and contrary to what Dowe (2000b) 
argues, our actual world most probably does not possess such symmetries, 
even if these latter allow us to elaborate physically relevant and useful 
approximations, which are justified in many practical cases (see section 3). 
Another aspect of the problem is that, strictly speaking, one cannot isolate any 
physical system from the interactions with the gravitational field (even if, again, 
in many physically useful and justified approximations one does consider 
gravitationally isolated systems). Moreover, the non-local nature of 
gravitational energy (in the precise sense discussed in section 3) prevents the 
proponent of the conserved quantity theory to consider any gravitational 
interaction as a causal interaction (a gravitational wave destroying a rock would 
not be considered as a causal interaction within this account). 
In a certain way, the case of the causal theory of properties is more 
complicated. We have seen that it requires that the world instantiates certain 
non-trivial global properties and it considers certain (many indeed) solutions of 
the Einstein field equations as metaphysically impossible. This conception can 
therefore clearly be challenged by the lack of such properties in our world. 
Insofar as it is a purely empirical question that remains debatable, this fact itself 
does not constitute a definitive objection against the causal theory of 
properties (section 5).  
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One can wonder how this conception accounts for the above mentioned 
fundamental aspects of spacetime and gravitation that cause so much trouble to 
the conserved quantity theory („background independence‟, non-local nature 
of gravitational energy). This question belongs to the actual debate about this 
conception of causation and properties. Another aspect of the same question is 
about whether the causal theory of properties applies to spacetime 
(gravitational) properties. At first sight, it seems that the dynamical nature of 
the spacetime and gravitational structure within GTR provides an explicit 
argument in favor of a causal interpretation of the spacetime properties. The 
argument is that metrical properties within GTR (represented by the metric 
tensor field and its functionals such as the Riemann tensor field) can be 
considered as causal in the sense that they have a causal role that is manifested 
by the action of tidal forces.30, 31 So the nature of the metrical (gravitational) 
properties is to produce tidal forces, which can be experienced by test particles 
for instance, via spacetime curvature. The presence of non-gravitational (mass-) 
energy is not necessary for such understanding, so that the causal 
understanding of metrical properties remains valid in the purely gravitational 
cases.  
If such causal understanding of spacetime properties seems attractive at 
first sight, a closer look shows that it is not free of difficulties. According to this 
conception, the spacetime (gravitational) structure causally acts on non-
gravitational (mass-)energy (via curvature and tidal forces) as well as on 
gravitational energy; this latter fact seems to imply that the spacetime 
(gravitational) structure causally interacts with itself. Moreover, the Einstein 
field equations do not privilege any „direction‟ in the interaction between the 
spacetime (gravitational) structure and non-gravitational (mass-)energy; if one 
understands one side of the Einstein field equations as causally acting on the 
other (“matter tells space how to curve”), then it seems that the inverse is 
equally true (“space tells matter how to move”). The conception of causation as 
production of certain effects is far from being clear in this context. These 
questions actually deserve to be discussed in details in a separate paper. 
 
 
30 The argument is mainly defended by Bartels (1996, 2009) as well as Bird (2009); for a critical 
point of view, see Livianos 2008. 
31 Baker (2005) argues that the cosmological constant  within GTR also provides an argument 
in favor of a causal understanding of spacetime.   
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